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I INTRODUCTION 
The operation of the criminal justice system is of great 
importance, both to those immediately affected by its 
operation, and also to society as a whole. The values of 
that system should therefore reflect values generally 
accepted by society as a whole. Our society generally 
accepts that not all breaches of the criminal law should 
result in a criminal prosecution. Thus, those who admin-
ister the prosecution process have a discretion to prose-
cute or not to prosecute. 
The way in which this discretion is exercised affects the 
quality of criminal justice, and also the way that society 
regards the criminal justice system. Thus that discretion 
should also be exercised in accordance with values and 
principles generally accepted by society as a whole. In 
the words of Lord Halsbury LC,
1 
•.. 'discretion' means when it is said that something is 
to be done within the discretion of the authorities that 
that something is to be done within the rules of reason 
and justice, not according to private opinion ... ; accord-
ing to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, 
vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. 
This paper will examine the prosecution process in terms 
of possible means of controlling the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion. These various possible means of 
control will be evaluated in terms of the standards of 
1 Sharpe v Wakefield [1891] AC 173, 179 
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fairness, consistency and accountability. It sets out 
to measure the value of possible control mechanisms, and 
to identify any features of the prosecution process which 
inhibit the control and management of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. 
II CRITERIA TO BE USED IN THE EVALUATION 
Evaluation of the prosecution process and possible con-
trol mechanisms should be carried out on the basis of 
declared principles and standards, against which the pro-
cess and those mechanisms can be measured.
2 
This paper 
will evaluate the efficacy of the prosecution process and 
possible control mechanisms against the standards of fair-
ness, consistency and accountability. 
It should be noted that these are not the only possible 
and relevant standards against which such an evaluation 
could be carried out. Other similar eval-uations of the 
prosecution process have considered factors such as effic-
3 
iency and cost. However, this paper will concentrate on 
fairness, consistency and accountability as they are stan-
dards which indicate the extent to which the prosecution 
process acts to serve the interests of justice for indi-
2 See the approach of the UK Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
(1981, Command 8092) 127-128 
3 See for example, above n 2, 128; Warren Young "The Crown Prosecu-
tion Service in England and Wales: Some Initial Impressions" 
(Unpublished paper prepared for the Law Commission, 1990) 8-10 
3 
viduals affected by the operation of the criminal justice 
system (as opposed to considerations such as the efficient 
use of public resources and funds.) 
A Fairness 
Fairness is an elusive concept and one which is difficult 
to define with any degree of certainty. What may appear 
fair to one person may not carry the same meaning for 
another. Thus, fairness may involve the weighing up of 
competing and conflicting considerations and values to 
achieve a result that is just, equitable and unbiased. 
In terms of the prosecution process, it might be argued 
that fairness is best achieved when prosecutors are 
obliged to bring a prosecution in all cases in which there 
is sufficient evidence that a criminal offence has been 
committed. Under such a system of mandatory prosecution, 
it can be argued that all persons affected by the oper-
ation of the criminal justice system are treated in an 
equal manner, and that this is the fairest result for all 
concerned as the scope for biases and prejudices would 
4 
appear to have been removed. 
However, others might argue that a prosecution process 
that operates in a more selective fashion is more fair 
4 Andrew Ashworth "Prosecutions, Police and Public - A Guide to Good 
Gatekeeping?" (1984) 23 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 65, 66 
4 
than one of mandatory prosecution. It is widely accepted 
that selective law enforcement is both necessary and 
desirable in the operation of modern criminal justice 
5 
systems. The criminal justice system would grind to a 
halt if every single breach of the criminal law was prose-
cuted. But also, a criminal prosecution is not always 
the most appropriate response in every case of criminal 
offending. In some cases, referring the offender to social 
services of some kind will be more appropriate than resor-
ting to the formal processes of criminal prosecution. And 
in other cases, an informal warning or formal caution may 
be a more appropriate and proportional response to the 
particular offence. A criminal prosecution can be a trau-
matic and expensive process for an accused person. Prose-
cution may also taint a person's reputation with the stigma 
of criminality. A person should only be subjected to the 
rigour of a criminal prosecution when there is adequate 
evidence that they have breached the criminal law, and the 
nature of the behaviour demands and jus~ifies a prosecu-
tion. 
Determining whether or not the behaviour in question demands 
and justifies a prosecution involves the weighing up of 
various factors for and against prosecutorial action. The 
5 See for example, above n 2, 128; above n 4, 66-67; Kevin O'Connor 
"Controlling Prosecutions" in John Basten, Mark Richardson, Chris 
Ronalds , George Zdenkowski (eds) The Criminal Injustice System 
(Australian Legal Workers Group NSW and the Legal Service Bulle-
tin, Sydney, 1982) 151, 154 
5 
balance struck between these factors should be one that 
is just, equitable and unbiased. This paper proceeds 
upon the basis that fairness can be achieved through 
selective law enforcement if prosecutorial discretion 
is exercised so that such a balance is struck. Selective 
law enforcement requires that there be a discretion to 
prosecute or not to prosecute. This discretion should 
be exercised in a manner that strikes a balance between 
the interests of society in seeing that the powerful 
instrument of criminal prosecution is used in a way that 
is not unduly oppressive, and its interest in seeing that 
those who break the written laws of society do not go 
unpunished.
6 Such a balance should be a fair one in terms 
of prosecution decisions being just, equitable and unbi-
ased. 
B Consistency 
The operation of the prosecution process-should be con-
sistent. The system should not display arbitrary and 
unexplainable variations in its treatment of individuals. 
Uniformity of policy and practice is necessary in the 
interests of fairness to individuals affected by the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion. While a decision to 
prosecute or not to prosecute must necessarily be made on 
6 Kevin O'Connor "Controlling Prosecutions" in John Basten, Mark 
Richardson, Chris Ronalds, George Zdenkowski (eds) The Criminal 
Injustice System (Australian Legal Workers Group NSW and the 
Legal Service Bulletin, Sydney, 1982) 151, 154 
6 
the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of 
each individual case, it must be possible to see over-
all, the operation of constant principles and standards, 
against which each case can be measured. 
Inequality and uneveness of treatment do not serve the 
interests of justice. In fact, equality of treatment 
is an important part of the concept of justice. Equal-
ity of treatment means that consistent policies and 
principles to guide decision-making within the prosecu-
tion process must operate within a system practising 
selective law enforcement. The fact that some are pros-
ecuted for their criminal behaviour and others are not 
can be reconciled with the concept of equality of treat-
ment so long as the principles and policies dictating 
the disposal of cases in the prosecution process are 
applied consistently. 
A Accountability 
Those who make prosecution decisions should be able to 
explain and justify those decisions, and they should be 
held responsible for the decisions that they make. Con-
versely, those who are affected by the exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion should be able to call to account 
the decision-makers. Accountability and the potential 
for it, have the consequence that decision-makers must 
always be concerned to make the most correct and approp-
7 
riate decision in the circumstances, thus promoting adher-
ence to appropriate principles and standards. Accounta-
bility also promotes the possibility of redress for those 
adversely affected by an incorrect or inappropriate decis-
ion in the prosecution process. 
III PROSECUTION POLICY GUIDELINES 
One way to control the exercise of discretion is to 'struc-
ture' the exercise of that discretion. Discretion is 
structured when the decision-maker is obliged to follow 
a certain procedure in reaching a decision.
7 
Prosecutorial 
discretion can be structured by the imposition of a set 
of accepted principles to be followed in prosecutorial 
decision-making. Some overseas jurisdictions have struc-
tured the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by means 
of the introduction and publication of detailed prosecu-
tion policy guidelines. 
A The Development of Prosecution Policy Guidelines 
In December 1982 the Federal Attorney-General of Australia 
tabled in the Federal Parliament a document entitled 
"Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth". This document 
was subtitled "Guidelines for the making of decisions in 
the prosecution process and the considerations upon which 
7 K Davis Discretionary Justice (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 
1971) 97-98 
8 
these decisions are made.
118 In 1986 new guidelines were 
issued in accordance with section 8 of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Aust). In 1990 these 
guidelines were reviewed, and revised accordingly. Thus, 
federal prosecution decisions in Australia are now made 
in accordance with publicly declared principles and stan-
dards.9 
The development of guidelines to structure the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion occurred in a similar fash-
ion in England and Wales. In 1983 the Attorney-General 
released a set of guidelines intended to guide the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion. Then in 1986, a revised 
set of guidelines was issued by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions under section 10 of the Prosecution of Offen-
ces Act 1985 (UK).
10 
B The Nature and Form of Prosecution Policy Guidelines 
1 "Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth" 
The prosecution policy guidelines operative in the Com-
monwealth of Australia are, in a nutshell, a broad state-
8 Note "Guidelines in Regard to Commonwealth Prosecutions" (1983) 
57 ALJ 198 
9 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Prosecution Policy of 
the Commonwealth (2 ed, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1990) 
10 UK Director of Public Prosecutions "Code for Crown Prosecutors" 
(1986) 83 Law Society's Gazette 2308 
9 
ment of the appropriate principles and considerations to 
be properly taken into account in the making of decisions 
in the prosecution process. Those decisions to be made 
in the course of the prosecution process, which are addres-
sed by the "Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth" 
include the decision to prosecute, the prosecution of 
juveniles, choice of charges, consents to prosecutions, 
discontinuance of a prosecution initiated by an officer 
of the Commonwealth, intervention in a private prosecution, 
mode of trial, charge-bargaining, ex-officio indictments 
and prosecution appeals against sentence decisions. 
The fullest statement of the principles and standards 
relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that 
is contained within this document is the "Criteria gov-
11 erning the decision to prosecute." . These criteria begin 
with a statement of the general principles which are to 
apply right through the decision-making process. There 
is, for example, a reminder to prosecutors of the finite 
nature of resources available for prosecution action, 
and a direction that these limited resources are to be 
employed pursuing only those cases worthy of prosecution. 
There is also a reminder which stresses the importance 
of decisions made in the prosecution process and the nec-
essity of making the correct decision in the interests of 
the victim, the suspected offender and the community at 
large. The objectives of fairness and consistency in the 
11 Above n 9, 3 
10 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion are also emphasised.
12 
The criteria then outlines a two-stage process in deciding 
whether or not to prosecute in an individual case. Firstly, 
prosecuting officials must consider whether the evidence 
is sufficient to justify the institution or continuation 
of a prosecution. The standard of evidential sufficiency 
that is required is a reasonable prospect of a conviction 
being secured. The matters to be properly considered in 
evaluating this prospect, include reliability and admis-
sibility of the available evidence, availability and 
credibility of witnesses, any lines of defence open to or 
indicated by the alleged offender, and any other factors 
which could affect the prospect of a conviction.
13 
The second stage of the decision-making process accord-
ing to the criteria involves the determination of whether 
the public interest requires a prosecution. There is 
express acknowledgement of the fact that-the factors 
properly relevant to the determination of this issue will 
vary from case to case, but a list of factors is given 
nonetheless. This list includes considerations relevant 
to the alleged offender (such as the physical and mental 
health or special infirmity of the alleged offender), the 
circumstances of the alleged offence (such as the seri-
12 Above n 9, 3 
13 Above n 9, 3-5 
11 
ousness of the alleged offence), the consequences of initi-
ating a prosecution (for example, considerations of cost 
and the likely outcome), and a number of considerations 
. 1 . 1 . f · f 1· d 14 invo ving eva uation o community ee ings an concerns. 
Also stated in the criteria are a list of considerations 
which are not to influence the decision whether or not 
to prosecute. These include the race, religion, sex, 
national origin, political association, activities or 
behaviour of the alleged offender or any other person 
involved. Also not to enter into the exercise of the 
discretion are personal feelings concerning the alleged 
offender or the victim, any possible political advantage 
or disadvantage to the Government or any other political 
party or group, or the possible effect of the decision 
in question on the personal or professional circumstances 
of those responsible for the decision to prosecute or not 
15 
to prosecute. 
These criteria are supplemented by other criteria and 
considerations which are to be applied in specific types 
of decisions within the prosecution process. For example, 
there are special considerations which apply in addition 
to the above stated criteria in decisions regarding the 
f . · 1 16 prosecution o Juveni es. 
14 Above n 9, 5-6 
15 Above n 9, 7 
16 Above n 9, 7-8 
12 
2 "Code for Crown Prosecutors" 
The policy statement guiding the exercise of prosecutor-
ial discretion in England and Wales, in the opinion of 
Sir Thomas Hetherington, the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions at the time of the Code being introduced, recognises 
the right of Crown Prosecutors to exercise their own dis-
cretion and outlines the criteria which should be applied 
in the exercise of that discretion. However, Sir Thomas 
stresses that the Code does not answer all of the quest-
ions that a Crown Prosecutor might be faced with.
17 
The Code has a similar format to the prosecution policy 
guidelines in operation in the Commonwealth of Australia, 
in that it follows a two-stage procedure. The first stage 
involves the evaluation of the issue of evidential suf-
ficiency. The standard of evidential sufficiency required 
is whether there is a realistic prospect of a conviction. 
As with the Australian guidelines, the matters relevant 
to the determination of this issue include the appropri-
ateness and reliability of the evidence and witnesses, 
and includes any lines of defence open to or indicated by 
the defence.
18 
The second stage of the decision-making process is whether 
the public interest requires that there be a prosecution. 
17 Sir Thomas Hetherington Prosecution and the Public Interest 
(Waterlow Publishers, London, 1989) 144, 147 
18 Above n 10, 2308 
13 
As with the Australian guidelines, there is acknowledge-
ment of the fact that the factors properly relevant to 
the determination of this issue will vary from case to 
case, although a list of factors to be considered is 
provided. This list includes the likely penalty, the 
staleness of the alleged offence, the youth of the alleged 
offender, the old age or infirmity of the alleged offen-
der, the attitude of the complainant and the need to 
ensure that proceedings are only continued against those 
whose involvement goes to the heart of the issue to be 
placed before the court. Additional considerations are 
given, which are to apply in cases involving sexual 
19 
offences. 
The Code also addresses decisions to be made in the con-
text of the discontinuance of proceedings, plea-bargain-
ing, charging practice, mode of trial, prosecution of 
juveniles, and the mode and venue of trial in cases where 
. ·1 · 1 d 20 Juveni es are invo ve . 
Thus, broadly speaking, the "Code for Crown Prosecutors" 
operates in a similar fashion to the "Prosecution Policy 
of the Commonwealth", and in fact, involve a number of 
similar principles and considerations to be applied in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
19 Above n 10, 2308 
20 Above n 10, 2310, 2312 
14 
3 The desired effect 
The Attorney-General of Australia in 1990, Michael Duffy, 
wrote that the purpose of the "Prosecution Policy of the 
Commonwealth" is, 21 
••• to promote consistency in the making of the various 
decisions which arise in the institution and conduct of 
prosecutions. DPP lawyers have considerable scope for 
the exercise of discretion at various stages of the 
prosecution process, and it is vital that they, and 
other Commonwealth officers engaged in law enforcement, 
have clear guidance in making these decisions. While 
this statement cannot, of course, tell DPP lawyers what 
their decision should be, it will help them to make the 
correct decision on the basis of sound judgment and the 
sensible exercise of discretion. The Statement will 
also serve the purpose of informing the public of the 
principles upon which the Office performs its statutory 
functions. 
The "Code for Crown Prosecutors" states that its purpose 
is to "promote efficient and consistent decision-making 
so as to develop and thereafter maintain public confidence 
. h s . I f f . d . 1122 in t e ervice s per ormance o its uties. 
Thus it would seem that the primary purpose of prosecu-
tion policy guidelines is to promote consistency in prose-
cutorial decision-making. The guidelines provide the 
principles and standards, according to which decisions in 
the prosecution process will be made. In theory, all 
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute, while being 
made on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances 
of each case, will be consistent with these governing 
principles and standards. 
21 Above n 9, iii 
22 Above n 10, 2308 
15 
Whether or not fairness is achieved by the implementation 
of prosecution policy guidelines depends largely on the 
nature of the factors to be taken into account under the 
guidelines. Both the "Prosecution Policy of the Common-
wealth" and the "Code for Crown Prosecutors" lay down a 
test of evidential sufficiency which aims to ensure that 
a prosecution does not proceed in the absence of an ade-
quate and properly prepared case against an accused. 
Thus, the guidelines take into account the unfairness 
engendered by a criminal prosecution against someone 
when there is insufficient evidence that that person 
committed the offence or was criminally responsible for 
the offence. 
The guidelines applicable in the Australian Commonwealth, 
and in England and Wales also require that prosecutions 
be in the public interest. Like fairness the 'public 
interest' is an elusive concept that is difficult to 
define with any degree of certainty, ana like fairness, 
evaluation of the public interest involves a balancing 
exercise.
23 In both sets of guidelines, the factors to be 
taken into account in themselves appear fair. For example, 
to take into account such things as the seriousness of 
the alleged offence, the youth of the alleged offender 
and the wishes of the victim seems, on the face of it, 
to be very fair. Thus, prosecution policy guidelines 
23 See above part II A; Andrew Ashworth "The 'Public Interest' Ele-
ment in Prosecutions" [1987] Crim LR 595, 596 
16 
aim to ensure that those involved in prosecutorial decis-
ion-making take into account matters which it is fair are 
considered. In fact the "Prosecution Policy of the Common-
wealth" goes a step further and includes a list of factors 
which if considered would engender unfairness.
24 
Thus, in theory, prosecution policy guidelines appear to 
promote fairness by setting forth factors, which in the 
interests of fairness can be considered. However, as 
noted above, evaluation of both fairness and the public 
interest involves a balancing exercise, and therefore, 
the way that the various factors interact and are applied 
in practice will be highly relevant to the degree of fair-
ness that can be achieved through the use of prosecution 
1 . 'd 1· 25 po icy gui e ines. 
To a certain extent it could also be said that prosecution 
policy guidelines aim to promote accountability in the 
prosecution process. Such guidelines se~ forth principles 
and standards, to which prosecutorial decision-makers must 
adhere. With the existence of declared principles and 
standards, individual decisions can be evaluated in light 
of these principles and standards to determine whether 
they are correct and appropriate decisions in the circum-
stances. Thus, those responsible for prosecutorial decis-
ion-making must be able to justify their decisions in 
24 Above n 9, 7 
25 For the problems associated with the application of prosecution 
policy guidelines, see below part III C 
17 
terms of the policy guidelines, and those affected by 
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute have notice 
of the principles and standards applicable in the making 
of the decisions affecting them. The possibility of 
redress for those affected by an incorrect or inappropr-
iate decision is promoted because, with publicly declared 
principles and standards it should be easier to assess 
whether such a decision was, in fact, an incorrect or 
inappropriate one. 
Thus, prosecution policy guidelines primarily aim to pro-
mote consistency in prosecutorial decision-making, But 
they also aim to promote fairness, and to a certain extent, 
accountability. The efficacy of such policy guidelines 
can only be assessed in light of the extent to which these 
purposes are achieved by the operation of prosecution 
policy guidelines. Such an assessment must necessarily 
consider the problems inherent in, and associated with 
the operation of prosecution policy guidelines. 
C The Efficacy of Prosecution Policy Guidelines 
Because of the wide range of circumstances in which decis-
ions to prosecute or not to prosecute are made, prosecution 
policy guidelines must necessarily be framed in terms of 
broad principles and standards. Such broadness is arguably 
necessary so that the decision-maker has room to make the 
most correct and appropriate response in widely varying 
18 
circumstances. Also, it is very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to reduce the factors involved in prosecutorial 
decision-making processes to a simple formula. However, 
this necessary breadth of approach that will be inherent 
in prosecution policy guidelines gives rise to some poten-
tial difficulties. 
Firstly, difficulties may be experienced in the interpre-
tation of the guidelines. Each decision-maker carries 
with them a set of personal values and experiences that 
will colour their approach to problem solving. Thus, 
decision-makers may not necessarily agree on the inter-
pretation of broad principles and standards. 
Also, approaches to applying these principles and stan-
dards to individual sets of circumstances may show diver-
gence between different decision-makers. These potential 
problems have been highlighted by British commentators, 
especially in terms of deciding what is -in the public 
interest. The 'public interest' is a very broad, and 
somewhat ambiguous phrase, which may well mean different 
things to different people. Definition of the public 
interest is likely to be a highly subjective process. 
26 
This has been pointed out by some of these commentators. 
As well as this, assessment of the public interest may 
26 Robert Munday "The Crown Prosecution Service - A Developing 
Discretion" (1985) 149 JP 564 
19 
involve the weighing up of competing considerations. For 
example, Andrew Ashworth has noted that, while it is only 
fair to victims that their feelings be taken into account, 
there may be cases in which the victim's wishes are in 
fl . . h h bl" · " d · 27 con ict wit ot er pu ic interest consi erations. 
Where conflicts such as this arise, different decision-
makers may well vary in their approach to determining 
the appropriate weight to be given to the particular fac-
tors. Thus, the opportunity for inconsistency arises 
again, although competing considerations may be less of 
a problem if the factors in the prosecution policy guide-
lines were prioritised. Guidance for decision-makers as 
to which factors are to carry the most weight may well 
eliminate some of the difficulties involved in reaching 
a decision where different considerations point to dif-
ferent conclusions. 
In addition to the problems associated with the necessary 
breadth of prosecution policy guidelines-and the interp-
retation of the guidelines, case 'construction' may be 
facilitated by the guidelines. It has been argued that 
criminal cases are constructed to present the particular 
picture which the police want to show. According to 
this line of reasoning, information can be structured and 
policy guidelines, principles and standards can be manip-
27 Above n 4, 70 
20 
ulated to produce the desired effect. 28 This argument 
holds that police goals and strategies are more import-
ant and influential in the initial treatment of a case 
than are official policy guidelines. 29 
There is evidence which suggests that where the police 
wish to pursue a matter they will often do so despite 
the existence of guidelines which indicate that an altern-
ative response may be more appropriate. For example, 
in one case which involved a fight outside a nightclub, 
a man was arrested for his part in the fight. The arrest-
ing officer conceded that normally the man would have 
been cautioned for his part in the fight, but "the reason 
he was charged was because we are objecting to the licence 
and [the club] and the more charges we've got the 
30 better." Another police officer said that where there 
are no obvious grounds for a charge, but it is felt that 
the situation demands action on the part of the police, 
they could "always find something to fit -the circumstances. 1131 
As well as 'constructing' a case, information and guide-
28 Andrew Sanders "Constructing the Case for the Prosecution" (1987) 
14 Journal of Law and Society 229; Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders 
Roger Leng The Case for the Prosecution (Routledge, London, 1991); 
Roger Leng, Michael McConville, Andrew Sanders "Researching the 
Discretions to Charge and to Prosecute" in David Downes (ed) 
Unravelling Criminal Justice (MacMillan, Houndmills, 1992) 119 
29 Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders, Roger Leng The Case for the 
Prosecution (Routledge, London, 1991) 105 
30 Above n 29, 112 
31 Andrew Sanders "Prosecution Decisions and the Attorney-General's 
Guidelines" [1985] Crim LR 4, 11 
21 
lines can be used and manipulated to 'de-construct' a 
case where the police do not wish to pursue the matter. 
Research material suggests that the police often play 
down domestic disputes which they are disinclined to 
follow up, despite the use of violence and any injuries 
which might have been inflicted. Generally, domestic 
incidents are regarded as 'rubbish' work by police offi-
cers and they are rarely inclined to initiate formal 
proceedings in respect of them (although it is possible 
that this pattern may have been affected by changes in 
policing policy in the context of domestic violence). 32 
The principal consequence of this phenomenon of 'case 
construction' for the operation of prosecution policy 
guidelines is that front-line police officers take 
action as they perceive that the situation demands. 
Generally they will proceed with the course of action 
which they perceive to be appropriate regardless of 
the course of action indicated by guidelines, principles 
and standards. They will simply present the information 
in a form which justifies their decision in terms of 
the relevant guidelines, principles and standards. For 
reasons discussed below, subsequent prosecutorial decis-
ion-makers will be largely unable to evaluate the valid-
33 ity of the police construction of the case. 
32 Above n 29, 33-34 
33 See below part IV A 4 
22 
Thus, rather than showing up defects in prosecutorial 
decision-making, prosecution policy guidelines may actu-
ally facilitate incorrect or inappropriate decision-
making by providing grounds for front-line police offi-
cers to justify their construction of the particular 
case. The incorrectness or inappropriateness of the 
police construction is even more unlikely to be uncov-
ered by subsequent decision-makers when that construc-
tion is framed in terms of officially promulgated princ-
iples and standards. 
Much of the criticism of the criteria contained in prose-
cution policy guidelines has been addressed to the public 
interest criteria. It seems that some consider assessment 
of evidential material less liable to misinterpretation or 
manipulation than public interest considerations. One 
h "d 34 commentator as sai , 
Once a departure is made, as has occurred with the present 
Guidelines, from criteria limited to legal and evidential 
matters to others of social policy nature there are bound 
to be areas of ambiguity and controversy. 
However, there are some indications that evidential mat-
ters may not be as straight forward as has been assumed. 
As Andrew Sanders has pointed out, it is often the men-
tal element in an offence which will be in question. 
That is, often what will be contentious is whether the 
suspect intended to commit the alleged offence, or the 
34 Above n 26, 564 
23 
reason why they committed the alleged offence, and not 
35 the actual commission of the alleged offence. 
This interpretation of the mental element can be import-
ant to the disposal of a particular case. For example, 
where a man was alleged to have chased and beaten an 
eight-month pregnant woman with whom he had previously 
had a relationship, the woman suffered a broken nose, a 
cut lip and bruising. Yet the alleged offender was 
only charged with assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm. When questioned as to why the charge was not a 
more serious one, the arresting officer said, "There's 
got to be intent. He meant to hit her but not neces-
sarily to do that amount of damage." It turned out 
that the interrogation in this case had been brief and 
no questions as to the intent of the alleged offender 
were asked of him.
36 
Thus, it can be seen that the evidential ~sufficiency 
criteria were used to justify a decision taken in a case 
which the arresting officer viewed merely as a 'domestic'. 
This also illustrates the point made above, namely that 
the police construction of the case will present the 
case to subsequent decision-makers in a form which just-
ifies the course of action which the police officer 
feels is appropriate. Because this case construction 
35 Andrew Sanders ''Constructing the Case for the Prosecution'' (1987) 
14 Journal of Law and Society 229, 234 
36 Above n 29, 117 
• 
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is presented to subsequent decision-makers in terms of 
officially sanctioned criteria (in this case, the evi-
dential sufficiency criteria), these decision-makers 
can not or will not look beyond this to determine the 
validity of the construction. 
Thus, the implementation and application of prosecution 
policy guidelines may give rise to problems caused by 
the necessarily broad nature of such guidelines. These 
problems may impede the promotion of fairness, consist-
ency and accountability in the prosecution process. 
Certainly the possibility of subjective interpretation 
and varying degrees of weight being given to particular 
criteria by different decision-makers threaten the 
principle of consistency. Fairness is also threatened, 
in that by misinterpretation of the criteria a case 
may go to court which should not or need not have done 
so. Conversely, a case may fail to reach court, when 
in all fairness it should have. Accountability is also 
threatened by the ability of decision-makers to manipu-
late information and guidelines to justify decisions 
that may not be correct or appropriate in the circum-
stances of the particular case. 
The problems of subjective interpretation of vague and 
ambiguous criteria, and variations in the weight given 
to particular criteria by different decision-makers in 
the prosecution process, may be controlled by means of 
II 
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staff training, consultation amongst decision-makers, 
detailed advice from superiors and by policy formulators 
being aware of everyday prosecutorial experiences and 
research in the area, and being prepared to review and 
revise prosecution policy guidelines in light of such 
experiences and research.
37 And as noted above, priori-
tising the factors contained in prosecution policy guide-
lines may eliminate the difficulties of competing con-
siderations. However, the problem of the possibility of 
manipulation of prosecution policy guidelines to achieve 
desired results and to justify decisions and actions 
taken by front-line police officers, is far less easily 
controlled and solutions to this problem are far less 
readily apparent. 
IV INTERNAL REVIEW MECHANISMS 
Discretion is 'checked' when actions and decisions are 
subject to review or reversal by another-decision-maker. 
'Checking' discretion by means of internal mechanisms 
may include review of decisions by other decision-makers, 
the reference of difficult problems to superiors, the 
involvement of independent decision-makers in the prose-
cution process and appeals to superior decision-makers 
by aggrieved parties. Supervising and checking the exer-
cise of discretion within the decision-making body may 
37 Andrew Ashworth "The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions" 
[1987] Crim LR 595, 606-607 
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provide protection against the arbitrary exercise of 
d
. . 38 1scret1on. 
In terms of prosecutorial decision-making, the 'checking' 
of discretion may be facilitated by means of the involve-
ment of other decision-makers in the decision-making pro-
cess, and by the giving of reasons for decisions to prose-
cute or not to prosecute. The giving of reasons for 
decisions by decision-makers may allow more effective 
supervision and review of decision-making, and may provide 
a basis for a system of appeals by aggrieved parties to 
superior decision-makers. 
A The Role of Other Decision-makers in the Prosecution 
Process 
Supervision and review of decisions to prosecute or not 
to prosecute may occur within the prosecution process. 
The decisions taken which initiate the p~osecution (for 
example, the decision to arrest a suspect), may be sub-
ject to supervision and review by superior officers. 
But also, the decision to prosecute in a particular case 
may be reviewed or actually made by other prosecutorial 
decision-makers who are independent of the police. 
1 Supervision and review by superior officers 
38 Above n 7, 142-144 
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In New Zealand prosecutions are initiated by means of 
arrest, summons or minor offence notice.
39 Therefore, 
cases enter the prosecution process via the exercise 
of discretion by individual police officers. In the 
case of an arrest, the initial decision which brings 
the case into the prosecution process is made by the 
initial arresting officer who is designated officer in 
charge of the case. This decision to arrest is subject 
to supervision and review by the section sergeant or 
the watchhouse senior sergeant when the alleged offen-
der is first brought into the police station. The 
officer in charge of the case then completes an arrest 
file with a report to their 'line supervisor' (who 
will usually be a sergeant), which includes a recom-
mendation as to whether or not to prosecute the alleged 
offender. Then it is usual practice for the line 
supervisor to sign the report and forward it to the 
relevant senior sergeant or detective senior sergeant. 
The senior sergeant or detective senior sergeant then 
approves the report and forwards it to the Police Prose-
cutions Section. The Police Prosecutions Section carry 
out very little active review at this stage, partly 
because they do not usually have the time (they will 
usually receive the file only a short time before the 
39 Michael Stace The Prosecution Process in New Zealand (Institute 
of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1985) 16-24; 
Warren Young, Neil Cameron, Robert Brown The Prosecution and 
Trial of Adult Offenders in New Zealand (Young & Cameron Policy 
and Research Consultants, Wellington, 1990) 11-23 
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defendant's first appearance in court), and partly 
because they will have insufficient information upon 
which to base such a review.
40 
With cases entering the prosecution process by way of 
summons or minor offence notice, the initial decision 
to take formal action is made by the officer in charge 
of the case. This officer will prepare a report for 
their line supervisor, which will include a recommend-
ation as to the charge to be brought. The line super-
visor then endorses or modifies this recommendation, 
and files containing recommendations in favour of 
prosecution are then sent to the Police Prosecutions 
Section for the final decision. Decisions against 
prosecution in cases involving summons or minor offence 
notices are sometimes made by the line supervisor, and 
sometimes by the Police Prosecutions Section.
41 
Thus, 
mechanisms for the supervision and review of the initial 
decisions which bring a case within the prosecution pro-
cess exist in New Zealand. 
2 Prosecutorial decision-making by 'independent' 
decision-makers 
In addition to supervision and review of decisions by 
40 Warren Young, Neil Cameron, Robert Brown The Prosecution and 
Trial of Adult Offenders in New Zealand (Young & Cameron Policy 
and Research Consultants, Wellington, 1990) 22, 26 
41 Above n 40, 23 
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superior officers, prosecutorial decisions may be super-
vised, reviewed or actually made by other decision-makers 
independent of the police. An illustration of this prin-
ciple in practice is the making of prosecution decisions 
by so-called 'independent' prosecutors, which occurs in 
both England and Wales, and in the Australian Commonwealth 
prosecution system. 
In England and Wales the Crown Prosecution Service (the 
CPS) was introduced under the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985 (UK). Under this Act the CPS has responsibility for 
the conduct of all criminal proceedings (with a few speci-
fied exceptions) which are instituted on behalf of a 
police force. The CPS is empowered to provide legal 
advice to the police before charges are laid when they 
specifically requested to do so by the police.
42 
The are 
CPS is also empowered to 'discontinue' proceedings follow-
43 
ing the arrest and charge of a suspect. 
In Australia the Office of the Director of Public Prose-
cutions was established by virtue of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Aust). The Director of 
Public Prosecutions (the DPP) and his or her delegates 
have the authority to start or stop a prosecution for 
any Commonwealth offence, whether or not that prosecution 
was initiated by a police officer, a public official or 
42 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (UK), section 3 
43 Above n 42, section 23 
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a private citizen. 
In both England and Wales, and the Australian Common-
wealth, most prosecutions are still initiated by the 
1 . 
45 B ·b·1· f h d t f th po ice. ut responsi i ity or t e con uc o e 
prosecution lies with the so-called 'independent' pros-
ecutor, who reviews the case as prepared by the police 
and may, where appropriate, amend the form of the pros-
ecution or drop the case altogether. 
3 The purpose of involving other decision-makers in 
the prosecution process 
The decisions made by front-line police officers which 
impact upon the prosecution process are often made in 
the heat of the moment during face to face encounters 
with suspects, victims and complainants.
46 
Supervision 
and review of police decision-making, and actual decis-
ion-making by independent prosecutors who are more 
removed form the situation which gives rise to the 
potential prosecution, can check any tendency to exer-
cise discretion in accordance with emotional responses 
to the situation, rather than in accordance with common 
sense, good policing practices and officially sanctioned 
44 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Aust), sections 6 and 9 
45 Andrew Sanders "An Independent Crown Prosecution Service?" [1986] 
Crim LR 16; Ian Temby "Prosecution Discretions and the Director 
of Public Prosecutions Act 1983" (1985) 59 AW 197, 199 
46 Above n 40, 13 
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principles and standards. 
The role of superior officers in supervising and review-
ing the actions and decisions of front-line police offi-
cers has been described by one police officer as,
47 
The officer on the case is looking to prove the case, 
which is what he is paid for and we wouldn't want it 
any other way. He's all fired up to do just that and 
that's what his job is. A custody officer's job is 
to stand back perhaps, to look at a wider situation, 
to appraise the situation in a wider light and to try 
and make a rational decision, one step removed from 
being intimately involved ... 
The involvement of a person less emotionally involved 
is also an argument in favour of an 'independent' prose-
cutorial decision-maker. It is argued that an 'independ-
ent' prosecutor counter-balances presumptions of guilt 
and commitment to the prosecution which the police might 
form during the investigation of an alleged offence, and 
48 
in initial dealings with an alleged offender. 
One of the key purposes in the institution of the CPS in 
England and Wales was to screen out weak and cautionable 
cases. The UK Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
had concluded that too many weak and cautionable cases 
47 Above n 29, 118. This comment was made by a custody officer in 
England. In England and Wales the custody officer has responsi-
bility for suspects in custody, for ensuring that the provisions 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) are complied 
with, and for ensuring that the Codes of Practice are complied 
with. These responsibilities include authorising the release of 
suspects from detention, informing suspects of their legal rights, 
keeping detailed custody records, and the decision as to whether 
suspects should be charged. See above n 29, 4 
48 Above n 2, 133 
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49 were being prosecuted, and thus the CPS was established 
as an attempt to remedy this situation. 
Thus, the purposes of involving other decision-makers in 
the prosecution process indicate that the promotion of 
fairness is one of the primary objectives. Supervision 
and review of decision-making by superior officers and 
prosecutorial decision-making by 'independent' decision-
makers supposedly encourages more neutral decision-making, 
which in itself should promote fairness. The involvement 
of other such decision-makers also aims to ensure that 
only the most appropriate cases continue within the pros-
ecution process. This would also seem to promote fairness. 
It would also seem that consistency is aimed for by the 
involvement of other such decision-makers. Those more 
removed from the situation giving rise to the potential 
prosecution would be in a better position than those 
making decisions in the heat of the momeRt, to weigh 
the particular decision up against accepted principles 
and standards. It is constant adherence to accepted 
principles and standards that will promote consistency 
across the wide range of decisions to be taken within 
the prosecution process. 
In addition, accountability would also seem to be pro-
49 Andrew Sanders "An Independent Crown Prosecution Service?" (1986] 
Crim LR 16 
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mated to a certain extent. Those making decisions would 
have to be aware that their decisions would always be 
subject to supervision and review, and sometimes to 
modification or even reversal. Those decision-makers 
who frequently made incorrect or inappropriate decisions 
could be detected. Thus, in theory, the involvement of 
other decision-makers in the prosecution process would 
seem to promote the principles of fairness, consistency 
and accountability within the prosecution process. 
4 The efficacy of involving other decision-makers in 
the prosecution process 
As other decision-makers (in addition to the police) are 
involved in the prosecution process in most other juris-
dictions in one form or another, problems thrown up by 
these types of control mechanisms have been identified, 
both in practice and by researchers. These problems 
must be considered in evaluating the efficacy of the 
involvement of other decision-makers in the prosecution 
process as a means of controlling the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion. 
There is a tendency for those supervising and reviewing 
decision-making to 'rubber-stamp' decisions. There are 
a number of possible reasons as to why this might occur. 
Firstly, those in supervisory roles might not have access 
to sufficient and adequate information to carry out any 
34 
kind of effective review. This applies not only to 
the supervision of decision-making by superior offi-
cers, but more especially to supervision, review and 
actual decision-making by so-called 'independent' 
prosecutors. 
The difficulties inherent in reviewing the appropriate-
ness of prosecutorial decision-making has been noted in 
so 
relation to the CPS in England and Wales. It has been 
found there that the information supplied to the CPS by 
the police was insufficient to allow adequate and inde-
pendent review of prosecution decisions taken by the 
police . As one Chief Crown Prosecutor has said,
51 
... I feel we suffer from a lack of information. The 
only public interest information we get is that pro-
vided by the police files. And that may be no more 
than 2 or 3 lines. 
An experimental program carried out in London during 
1988 showed up the difficulties faced by the CPS in 
trying to carry out their duties without sufficient or 
adequate information. During the course of the program 
a certain group of alleged offenders were targeted, and 
the Inner London Probation Service provided the CPS 
with verified information on the personal circumstances 
of these alleged offenders, in order to assist Crown 
Prosecutors in deciding whether a prosecution was just-
50 Above n 3, 12-15 
51 S Elliman "Independent Information for the Crown Prosecution 
Service" (1990) 140 New Law Journal 812 
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ified in the public interest. 
The rate at which prose-
cutions were discontinued by the CPS rose from 1% prior 
to the implementation of the program, to 7% during the 
52 
course of the program. 
This problem of insufficient information being available 
to those supervising, reviewing and actually making 
decisions so as to enable thorough and effective review 
of previous decisions and actions has also been noted 
with regard to the Police Prosecutions Section in New 
Zealand. 
The point has been made that a lack of adequate 
information contributes to the tendency of police prose-
cutors not to carry out effective review of previous 
1
. d . . 53 po ice ecisions. 
Adequate information will be necessary for any effective 
supervision and review of prosecutorial decision-making 
to occur. 
Otherwise supervisors and subsequent decision-
makers will have their hands tied, sot~ speak, and may 
have no alternative but to rubber-stamp previous decisions. 
Also a problem is the disproportionate influence that 
early decisions in the prosecution process will have 
over later ones. 
Researchers in various jurisdictions 
have noted a tendency for a 'presumption in favour of 
prosecuting' to dominate once prosecution proceedings 
52 Amanda J Brown "Diverting Cases from Prosecution in the Public 
Interest" (1992) 32 Home Office Research Bulletin 7, 9; above n 51 
53 Above n 40, 26 
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are initiated. 54 It may well be that this presumption 
is largely attributable to the lack of adequate inform-
ation available to later decision-makers to enable effec-
tive review of earlier decisions. 
But it is also pos-
sible that this is something which operates independently 
of a lack of adequate information. 
It may well be that 
those involved in prosecutorial decision-making form an 
'occupational commitment' to pursuing prosecutorial pro-
ceedings, and are reluctant to discontinue such proceed-
ings once they have been initiated. 
This presumption, 
whatever the reasons that cause it to operate, might be 
said to exist in New Zealand at present. 
Certainly it 
is rare for the decisions of officers in charge of cases 
to be modified or reversed.
55 
Another difficulty inherent in the effective control of 
prosecutorial discretion by other decision-makers in 
the prosecution process arises from the construction of 
criminal cases by front-line police offi~ers as discus-
sed above. 56 The control that front-line police officers 
exercise over the gathering of evidence gives them the 
opportunity to characterize the case in such a way as to 
justify their own decisions and actions.
57 
Such construc-
tions will usually be framed in terms of legitimate con-
siderations and officially sanctioned principles and 
54 Above n 49, 24 
55 Above n 40, 22-23 
56 See above part III C 
57 Above n 29, 135 
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standards, so that it will be difficult for subsequent 
decision-makers to gain a more objective view of the 
case. 
This will be especially so where those subsequent 
decision-makers do not have access to adequate or suffi-
cient information to counter-act this construction pro-
cess. 
Thus, while in theory, supervision, review and actual 
decision-making by other decision-makers in the prose-
cution process may appear to act towards the promotion 
of fairness, consistency and accountability, there are 
problems which considerably impede the ability of such 
mechanisms to do so. 
Problems involving a lack of 
information being available to such subsequent decision-
makers may possibly be surmounted by alternative sources 
of information being made available to them. 
This cer-
tainly strengthened the position of the CPS in London 
during the course of the experimental program discussed 
above. 
However, the use of such a sche~e may be prob-
lematic in terms of the efficient use of resources and 
the extra workload created by the generation and consid-
eration of additional information. 
Solutions to the 
problems raised by the construction of criminal cases 
by front-line police officers, and the existence of a 
presumption in favour of prosecuting are far less readily 
apparent. 
B The Giving of Reasons for Decisions 
38 
1 The operation of reason-giving in the prosecution 
process 
One commentator on the prosecution process has suggested 
that perhaps the police should be required to record 
reasons for failing to proceed with complaints, in order 
to facilitate review of such decisions.
58 
This suggest-
ion could be extended to other decisions in the prosecu-
tion process. 
The giving of reasons for decisions is a means of 'struc-
t 
. ' h . f d. . 
59 
B h . · f uring t e exercise o iscretion. ut t e giving o 
reasons for decisions can also facilitate the 'checking' 
of the exercise of discretion, in that it may provide 
a basis for the supervision and review of decisions made 
in the exercise of a discretionary power. 
Those super-
vising and reviewing decision-making in the prosecution 
process could weigh up the reasons given for the partic-
ular decision against appropriate standards and principles. 
The giving of reasons for decisions may also facilitate 
appeals to superior officials within the prosecution 
process by those adversely affected by decisions to 
prosecute or not to prosecute. 
Those concerned about 
particular exercises of prosecutorial discretion could 
request that the reason for the decision be made known 
58 Above n 6, 160 
59 Above n 7, 103-106 
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to them. 
If then they were aggrieved by the reason 
for the decision, they could appeal to a superior offi-
cial in the prosecution process on the basis that the 
particular decision was an inappropriate one, or was 
deficient in some way. 
Thus, the giving of reasons 
for decisions made in the course of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion may form the basis of inter-
nal review mechanisms in more than one way. 
2 The purpose of giving reasons for decisions in the 
prosecution process 
A requirement that decisions be justified by appropriate 
reasons would seem to protect those affected by the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion against arbitrary 
decision-making. 
Being required to give reasons for 
decisions means that prosecutorial decision-makers must 
be able to justify their decisions in terms of legiti-
mate and appropriate principles and sta~dards. 
Decis-
ions which are not consistent with such principles and 
standards should then be able to be detected. 
Thus, 
on the face of it, consistency would appear to be a goal 
of reason-giving as a control mechanism in the prosecu-
tion process. 
Whether or not fairness is promoted by 
reason-giving in the prosecution process would depend on 
whether the principles and standards to which the reas-
ons are referring are themselves fair. 
• 
40 
The giving of reasons for decisions would also seem to 
aim for accountability in the prosecution process. 
Those 
making decisions would be required to give reasons for 
their decisions, thus facilitating supervision and review 
of decision-making, or appeals to superior officials in 
the prosecution process. 
Decision-makers could be called 
to account for their decisions, and those adversely affec-
ted by prosecutorial decision-making would have a poten-
tial means of redress. 
3 The efficacy of reason-giving as a control mechanism 
in the prosecution process 
There are some problems associated with the practice of 
the giving of reasons for decisions, and such problems 
must necessarily be taken into account in any evaluation 
of the efficacy of this mechanism in controlling the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Firstly, it may be that the reasons given for the decision 
involve information of a personal or confidential nature. 
For example, a decision not to prosecute may be justified 
by information regarding the alleged offender's medical 
history which is given to the decision-maker in confidence. 
Or it may be that the reason given for a particular decis-
ion may involve express or implied criticism of the char-
acter and credibility of a witness or complainant.
60 
The 
60 Above n 17, 153 
• 
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appropriateness of making this information available is 
questionable. 
Secondly, the reason given for a particular prosecutorial 
decision may bear little relation to the true motivation 
for the particular decision.
61 
Under section 23 of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (UK), Crown Prosecutors 
are required to give reasons for discontinuing a prose-
cution. 
The early experiences of this practice seemed 
to indicate a tendency to simply make reference to parts 
of the "Code for Crown Prosecutors
11
•
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This kind of practice gives little indication to superior 
decision-makers and those affected by the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, exactly what the true motivation 
of the decision-maker was, and which particular circum-
stances of the case influenced the disposal of it. 
Such 
reasons, while not necessarily disclosing what they are 
intended to disclose, seem to provide a ~sufficient justi-
fication for the decision by reference to officially san-
ctioned principles and standards. 
In other words, reasons 
tend to become 'routinised' and given in a formulaic fash-
ion, thus achieving few or none of their purposes. 
Thus, the giving of reasons for decisions entails some 
problems which may well impede the promotion of fairness, 
61 Above n 7, 105 
62 Above n 37, 606 
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consistency and accountability within the prosecution 
process. The question of whether the protection of con-
fidential and personal information, or the goal of a 
fair, consistent and accountable prosecution system is 
more important is certainly a tricky one, although it 
could be argued that to disclose information of a pers-
onal or confidential nature in itself constitutes unfair-
ness. And like the problem of case construction by 
front-line police officers, justifying decisions by ref-
erence to officially sanctioned principles and standards 
as reasons for those decisions, is both difficult to 
detect and not easily combatted or controlled. These are 
problems, to which there is no easy or obvious answer. 
V CONTROL OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE COURTS 
Courts indirectly monitor the prosecution process. If 
a prosecution is carried out in the absence of suffici-
ent and admissible evidence then that prQsecution should 
fail in court (unless the alleged offender pleads guilty). 
And the court has some power in its sentencing discretion 
to comment, indirectly as the case may be, on the appropr-
. f · 1 · 63 Th 1 1ateness o a part1cu ar prosecution. e court may a so 
express views on the merits of a particular prosecution, 
which may be conveyed in the summing up to the jury, or 
in the power of the court to award costs.
64 
63 Above n 6, 161 
64 Above n 17, 177 
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This indirect influence, while it may not necessarily 
affect the prosecution in hand, may well affect the 
decisions of prosecutorial decision-makers in the bring-
ing of similar prosecutions in the future. However, 
this indirect means of influence available to the court 
will only impact upon those cases in which prosecutorial 
action is taken. Those cases which do not reach court 
remain beyond the court's sphere of influence. Also, 
the ability of the courts to monitor the prosecution 
process in these ways is often contingent upon a plea of 
not guilty. And even when such a plea is entered, judic-
ial supervision is somewhat sporadic and largely ineffect-
. 65 
1. ve. 
But the court may be able to exert influence over the 
prosecution process in more substantial and direct ways. 
The power of the courts to control the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by means of judicial review and 
the abuse of process jurisdiction of the- court will be 
considered here. 
A Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decision-making 
Review of prosecutorial decision-making by the courts 
may operate at two distinct levels. Firstly, review may 
65 Neil Cameron "Developments and Issues in Policing New Zealand" in 
Neil Cameron and Warren Young (eds) Policing at the Crossroads 
(Allen & Unwin in association with Port Nicholson, Wellington, 
1986) 7, 28 
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be aimed at prosecution policies in general, or secondly, 
it might consider specific instances of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
I Review of prosecution policies in general 
The leading case in this area is! v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn.
66 This case dealt with 
the attempts of Mr Blackburn to compel the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner to take action by way of prosecution 
against illegal gambling. The Metropolitan Police Com-
missioner had issued an instruction that the police were 
to take no proceedings against clubs for breaches of the 
gaming laws unless there were complaints of cheating, or 
the club had become the haunt of criminals. Strictly 
speaking, the policy was not one of non-enforcement since 
there were circumstances in which prosecutions might be 
brought. However, in court the policy was treated as 
effectively being one of non-enforcement; which in reality 
it probably was. 
In Blackburn the English Court of Appeal held that the 
police had a wide-ranging discretion in the investigation 
and prosecution of offences, with which the courts could 
not interfere. However, it was held that police officers 
have a duty to enforce the law, and if, as was held to be 
the case in this situation, they were failing to do so, 
66 [1968] 2 QB 118 
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then the courts could intervene. Lord Denning MR expres-
sed this 67 as, 
Although the chief officers of police are answerable to 
the law, there are many fields in which they have a dis-
cretion with which the law will not interfere. For ins-
tance, it is for the Commissioner of Police of the Metrop-
olis, or the chief constable, as the case may be, to 
decide in any particular case whether inquiries should 
be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made, or a 
prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on 
the disposition of his force and the concentration of 
his resources on any particular crime or area. No court 
can or should give him direction on such a matter. He 
can also make policy decisions and give effect to them, 
as, for instance, was often done when prosecutions were 
not brought for attempted suicide. But there are some 
policy decisions with which, I think, the courts in a 
case can, if necessary interfere. Suppose a chief con-
stable were to issue a directive to his men that no per-
son should be prosecuted for stealing any goods less 
than ~100 in value. I should have thought that the court 
could countermand it. He would be failing in his dut y 
to enforce the law. 
The question of importance left open by the court in the 
Blackburn case is, at what point will the courts inter-
vene to control the exercise of the discretion ? Salmon LJ 
gave some indication. For him the point at which the 
courts would intervene would be where there was "a clear 
breach of duty ... so improper that it could not amount 
to an exercise f d · · 
1168 Th . h . d o iscretion. e question ten raise 
by this is, just how will the court determine whether a 
prosecution policy is a clear breach of duty, and how 
will they be able to judge what does and does not amount 
to an exercise of discretion? 
67 Above n 66, 136 
68 Above n 66, 139 
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Blackburn indicates that the courts can review general 
prosecution policies, and they may intervene where they 
perceive that the policy in question amounts to a fail-
ure on the part of the police to carry out their duty 
to enforce the law. Blackburn, however, did not con-
sider the question of judicial review in a specific 
instance of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
2 Review of specific prosecutorial decisions 
The courts' approach to this issue has been to disting-
uish between discretionary powers derived from statute, 
and those which are a prerogative power. In Hallet v 
Attorney-General, Gallen J held that the exercise of a 
statutory power could be subject to review by the courts, 
while the exercise of a prerogative power could not be 
. d 69 rev1ewe . 
In the Hallet case the decision in question was the fail-
ure of a Department of Labour inspector to prosecute 
Mainzeal Corporation Ltd for breaches of the Construction 
Act 1959 and the Construction Regulations 1961. It was 
held that the power to prosecute under this legislation 
70 
and these regulations was a statutory power. However, 
Henry J held that the decision in question was not review-
able, notwithstanding the fact that it was an exercise 
69 [1989] 2 NZLR 87, 91 
70 Hallet v Attorney-General (No 2) [1989] 2 NZLR 96, 100 
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of a statutory power. The judge saw the case as one which 
was asking the court to review the weighing up of the 
factors that went to the making of the decision. Henry J 
shied away from any suggestion that the court should find 
that the defendant's obligation was to prosecute, a find-
ing he saw as going beyond the court's proper sphere of 
involvement. 71 Thus, any review of a prosecution decision 
can not be based on a ground that requires the court to 
evaluate the merits of a particular decision to prosecute 
72 or not to prosecute. 
Certain decisions in the prosecution process have been 
held to be reviewable and others to be unreviewable. A 
prosecution decision made by a Crown Solicitor is not 
reviewable. 73 Similarly unreviewable, are decisions of 
the Solicitor-General acting as alter-ego of the Attorney-
General in the making of either an original or an ex 
officio decision to prosecute. 74 The reviewability of both 
the Solicitor-General's decision to consfrnt to a prosecu-
tion decision taken by another official, 75 and the decision 
to nolle prosequi 76 have been left open in New Zealand. 
However, the former has been held to be reviewable in Aust-
ralia.77 It has been pointed out that these latter two 
71 Above n 70, 102-103 
72 GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1991) 23 
73 Saywell v Attorney-General [1982] 2 NZLR 97 
74 Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 
75 Shanks v Latham Unreported, 18 February 1988, High Court Tauranga 
Registry M 5/88 
76 Amery v Solicitor-General [1987] 2 NZLR 292 
77 Buffier v Bowen (1987) 72 ALR 256 
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decisions may be more open to review than some of the 
others as they occur later than, and in review of the 
initial decision to prosecute, and therefore have more 
f " d h " 78 o an or inary administrative c aracter . 
As far as the reviewability of police decisions to prose-
cute goes, the position is uncertain. It has been argued 
that the police have the responsibility of administering 
certain enactments (for example, the Crimes Act 1961 and 
the Summary Offences Act 1981), and are thus covered by 
what was said in Hallet as to the reviewability of statu-
79 
tory powers. But given what was said in Blackburn as to 
the width of the discretion of the police in enforcing 
the law, it would seem that the court's power to intervene 
is very limited. Thus, it would seem that the courts will 
be slow to review any specific prosecution decisions made 
by the police. 
B Abuse of Process 
The court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay criminal 
proceedings in which an abuse of process has occurred. 
Lord Reid in Connelly v DPP said that "there must always 
be a residual discretion to prevent anything which sav-
80 
ours of abuse of process." In the same case Lord Morris 
78 Above n 72, 23 
79 Above n 72, 22 
80 [1964] AC 1254, 1296 
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of Borth-y-Gest described this inherent jurisdiction 
81 as, 
... a Court which is endowed with a particular juris-
diction has powers which are necessary to enable it 
to act effectively within such jurisdiction. I would 
regard them as powers which are inherent in its juris-
diction. A Court must enjoy such powers in order to 
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any 
abuses of its processes and to defeat any attempted 
thwarting of its processes. 
The exact scope and extent of this jurisdiction has been 
82 somewhat vigorously debated. In both Connelly v DPP 
83 and Humphrys v DPP, there was a division of opinion 
amongst the members of the House of Lords as to whether 
a court could actually stay proceedings to prevent an 
abuse of its processes. However, since these cases were 
decided there have been many successful applications to 
stay proceedings on the basis that they involve an abuse 
84 of process. Thus, it now seems widely accepted that a 
court may go so far as to stay criminal proceedings where 
the processes of the court have been abused. 
This doctrine of abuse of process is accepted in New Zealand 
85 also. In Moevao v Department of Labour Richardson J "d 86 sai , 
81 Above n 80, 1301-1302 
82 See for example, Rosemary Pattenden "The Power of the Courts to 
Stay a Criminal Prosecution" [1985] Crim LR 175; David M Paciocco 
"The Stay of Proceedings as a Remedy in Criminal Cases: Abusing 
the Abuse of Process Concept" (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal 315 
83 [1977] AC 1 
84 Rosemary Pattenden "The Power of the Courts to Stay a Criminal 
Prosecution" [1985] Crim LR 175, 176 
85 Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 
86 Above n 85, 482 
• 
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The justification for staying a prosecution is that 
the Court is obliged to take that extreme step in 
order to protect its own processes from abuse. It 
does so in order to prevent the criminal processes 
from being used for purposes alien to the adminis-
tration of criminal justice under the law. It may 
intervene in this way if it concludes from the con-
duct of the prosecutor in relation to the prosecu-
tion that the Court processes are being employed 
for ulterior purposes or in such a way (for exam-
ple, through multiple or successive proceedings) 
as to cause improper vexation and oppression ... 
[T]he focus is on the misuse of the Court processes 
by those responsible for law enforcement. 
The power of the courts to stay criminal proceedings 
where the court perceives there has been an abuse of 
its processes has been exercised in a wide range of 
circumstances. One such example is multiplicity of 
proceedings. Connelly involved this very issue. In 
that case, Connelly had been charged with murder and 
had been acquitted at trial. Following this acquittal 
Connelly was indicted for a robbery which was committed 
at the same time and the same place as the alleged mur-
der. The House of Lords held this to be an abuse of 
process. This doctrine has been accepted in New Zealand. 
In Amery v Solicitor-General Cooke P said, " ... that 
to issue lesser criminal charges based on the same found-
87 ation is an abuse of the process of the Court." 
Another example of circumstances which have been held 
to constitute an abuse of process is where there has 
been an unreasonable delay in the course of the proceed-
87 Above n 76, 294 
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ings.
88 
This delay may relate to the commencement of 
a prosecution, as in Watson v Clarke. 89 In that case 
Robertson J said, 90 
Just as there is a duty on the prosecution to bring 
an information or charge, so there is a duty on them 
to prosecute that information or charge as expediti-
ously as reasonably possible. 
But the delay may also relate to the continuation of 
a prosecution. In Department of Social Welfare v Stewart 
Wylie J held that, 91 
... if the delay is so excessive as to raise a pre-
sumption of prejudice or unfairness (and whether such 
presumption will arise may depend on the nature of 
the case) then there is an abuse and the Court must 
act to prevent it. 
However, it has been held that there is no general prin-
ciple that an unreasonable delay will preclude a trial 
or vitiate a conviction. The relevance of the delay 
will depend on whether the effect of the delay has been 
to render the trial unfair.
92 For example, a "deliberate 
decision" not to prosecute in 1984, which was followed 
by a prosecution based on the same complaint of rape 
in 1992, has been held to be an abuse of process because 
of evidentiary prejudice which could not be overcome.
93 
88 See J Kovacevich "The Inherent Power of the District Court: Abuse 
of Process, Delay and the Right to a Speedy Trial" [1989) NZW 184 
89 [1990) 1 NZLR 715 
90 Above n 89, 727 
91 [1990) 1 NZLR 697, 713 
92 Jago y District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, 59-60; 
R v Accused [1991) 3 NZLR 405, 407; B. v Ihaka Unreported, 22 June 
1993, Court of Appeal CA 442/92 
93 R v T Unreported, 1 September 1992, High Court Auckland Registry 
T 126/92 
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Criminal proceedings may also be stayed where there 
was an improper motive for prosecuting. In Spautz v 
Williams a number of private prosecutions were brought 
to pressure a former employer into reinstating the for-
mer employee or settling a wrongful dismissal claim. 
The private prosecutions were held to be an abuse of 
94 process. Other examples of circumstances in which 
the court may stay proceedings on the basis of an abuse 
of process include where a prosecutorial bargain has 
been breached by the prosecution, where there has been 
an abuse of committal proceedings and where oppression 
at trial occurs. 95 The sets of circumstances outlined 
above are only examples of some of those situations in 
which the court may find that there has been an abuse 
of process. 
It has been pointed out that the power of the court to 
stay criminal proceedings should be reserved for excep-
. 1 96 A d · th h . t t. t t1ona cases. ccor 1ng to e aut or~ a 1ve sate-
ments of the doctrine there are two key requirements 
which must be met before the court can stay the proceed-
ings. Firstly, there must be some serious prejudice to 
the defendant. And secondly, there must be circumstances, 
which if the trial were to continue would subvert the 
judicial process, and these circumstances should consti-
94 [1983] 2 NSWLR 506, 545-546 
95 See the examples given in above n 82 
96 Above n 83, 26; above n 74, 36; R v Heston-Francois [1984] 1 All 
ER 785, 792 
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tute more than simple unfairness to the accused. 97 Only 
where these criteria are satisfied should the court 
intervene to control prosecutorial discretion, or more 
precisely, to control misuse of the discretion. 
C The Purpose of Involving the Courts in the Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
It has been noted already that control mechanisms located 
within the prosecution process are subject to a number of 
difficulties in controlling the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.
98 
It is possible that the involvement of the 
courts in the control of prosecutorial discretion may 
overcome some of these difficulties because of the court's 
lack of involvement in the prosecutorial decision-making 
process. 
The primary virtue of the involvement of the courts is 
the promotion of accountability in the prosecution pro-
cess. The availability of a remedy in the courts is the 
ultimate form of accountability for those seeking to 
control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Those 
making decisions in the prosecution process will potent-
ially be subject to legal sanctions, and those affected 
by prosecutorial decision-making will be able to call to 
account the decision-makers and have a powerful potential 
97 Above n 84, 189 
98 See above parts III C, IV A 4 and IV B 3 
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means of redress for incorrect or inappropriate decis-
ions. 
D The Efficacy of the Courts in Controlling Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Fairness would seem to be promoted only to a limited 
extent by the courts' involvement in controlling prose-
cutorial discretion. Unfair prosecution policies could 
only be challenged if they amount to a clear breach of 
99 
the duty of the police to enforce the law. The Blackburn 
decision as noted above, envisaged the scope for court 
intervention as being very limited and it seems unlikely 
that the mere fact of unfairness would be sufficient to 
motivate a court to intervene. 
In terms of specific prosecution decisions, the power of 
the courts to act against unfairness is again, very lim-
ited. The courts have been very reluctant to review 
decisions of this nature. 
Police v Hall,lOO 
As was said by Woodhouse Jin 
.•. it must normally be regarded as inappropriate for 
a judicial officer, whether judge or magistrate, to 
control executive officers in their decisions as to 
the initiation of prosecutions. Public confidence in 
the essential detachment of the judiciary would be 
affected if they seemed to be taking a hand in the 
formulation of charges in the criminal courts. 
99 This would be the position if the comments of Salmon LJ in 
B. v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 
2 QB 118, 139 are to be taken as representative of the correct 
legal position in this area. 
100 [1976] 2 NZLR 678, 683 
• 
SS 
As for abuse of process as a basis upon which to challenge 
unfair prosecution decisions, this would only apply to 
decisions to prosecute, and not to decisions not to prose-
cute. Also, abuse of process has been said to be limited 
to exceptional cases. Under the doctrine of abuse of 
process, unfairness to the accused will be insufficient 
to found an application to stay proceedings. Abuse of 
process is not so much a control of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, as a means of controlling extreme misuses of 
that discretion. Thus, it might be concluded that the 
extent to which fairness is promoted in the prosecution 
process by the courts' control of prosecutorial discretion 
is, indeed, very limited. 
The extent to which consistency is promoted by the courts' 
control of prosecutorial discretion is also questionable . 
Firstly, for the issue to be dealt with by the courts it 
would have to have been raised by the defendant. The 
degree to which defendants in the criminal justice system 
are likely to do this is questionable, especially given 
the very high degree to which guilty pleas operate within 
the system. A study of prosecutions in New Zealand Dis-
trict Courts in 1981 and 1982 found that 75% of all prose-
cutions result in 
101 
a guilty plea. In addition to the 
high incidence of guilty pleas, very few defendants corn-
101 Michael Stace "The Police as Prosecutors" in Neil Cameron and 
Warren Young (eds) Policing at the Crossroads (Allen & Unwin in 
association with Port Nicholson, Wellington, 1986) 144, 145 
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plain about their treatment at the hands of the police, 
or challenge the validity of the behaviour of the police 
in any way. The general response of almost all defendants 
in the criminal justice system is to regard police behav-
. 1 . . . h 11 102 iour as egitimate or as immune to c a enge. 
Also, the power of the courts to control the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion is what might be called a 
'backup' solution. That is, it comes into play after 
an incorrect or inappropriate decision has been made. 
It is control from within the prosecution process that 
will truly promote consistency in decision-making. The 
power of the courts can be seen as backup when the prose-
cution process has failed to produce consistent and approp-
riate results. To have a backup for those who have been 
subject to unjust treatment within the prosecution process 
is one thing, but to rely on that backup to promote con-
sistency within the prosecution process is another. Rely-
ing on the courts in this way means that those who have 
been treated unfairly or unjustly would be subjected to 
the stress, trauma and expense involved in going to court 
for a remedy when, in fact, the situation should never 
have arisen at all. 
The reluctance of the courts to become involved in review-
ing prosecution decisions, and the fact that abuse of pro-
cess should be limited to exceptional cases, means that 
102 Above n 65, 28 
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only the most extreme and blatant misuses of power will 
be subject to control by the courts. The great number 
of incorrect and inappropriate prosecutorial decisions 
probably do not involve this degree of severity and, there-
fore, probably will not be subjected to the courts' scru-
tiny or control. 
The value of abuse of process as a means of promoting 
consistency in the prosecution process is especially lim-
ited as it only operates in respect of decisions to prose-
cute, and will not affect incorrect or inappropriate 
decisions not to prosecute. For consistency to be truly 
promoted, all prosecutorial decision-making should be 
subject to the control mechanism. 
Because of the limited nature of the courts' ability to 
control prosecutorial discretion, the extent to which 
accountability is promoted within the prosecution process 
is also accordingly limited. Those prosecution decisions 
which do fall within the courts' powers of control will 
involve high degrees of accountability, in that the 
decision-makers will be accountable to the law of the 
land. However, as noted above, the numbers of cases which 
fall within this sphere of control are likely to be very 
few, and not all inappropriate or incorrect decisions will 
be subject to this control. 
Thus, as a means of controlling prosecutorial discretion 
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the courts will be effective only in some of the cases 
involving extreme and blatant misuses of discretion. 
The bulk of cases will fall outside of the courts' sphere 
of influence. The chances of the courts extending their 
control over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
are not good if the attitudes of the courts up until now 
are h . b 103 anyt 1ng to go y. 
VI THE POLICE COMPLAINTS AUTHORITY 
A The Nature and Form of the Police Complaints Authority 
The Police Complaints Authority was established by virtue 
of the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988. The purpose 
of this Act was" ... to make better provision for the 
investigation and resolution of complaints against the 
Police by establishing an independent Police Complaints 
Authority. 11104 
The Authority consists of a person appointed by the Govern-
ore-General on the recommendation of the House of Represent-
atives. Such a person must be qualified as a barrister or 
solicitor of the High Court, and must possess suitable legal 
experience for the task in hand.
105 
The Authority is 
appointed for a term of two to five years, and may be reap-
103 See for example, above n 76, 458-459; above n 90, 682-683; Newby 
v Moodie (1987) 78 ALR 603, 605 
104 Preamble to the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988 
105 Above n 104, section 4 
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. d 106 pointe . 
Section 12 of the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988 
sets out the functions of the Authority. The functions 
relevant to the control of prosecutorial discretion are 
contained within section 12(l)(a). That paragraph states 
that the Authority is to receive complaints alleging any 
misconduct or neglect of duty by any member of the Police, 
or complaints concerning any practice, policy or procedure 
of the Police which affects the complainant in a personal 
capacity. 
Once a complaint is received, the Authority may invest-
igate the complaint, defer action until it receives a 
report from the Commissioner of Police on a Police invest-
igation, or oversee a Police investigation of the complaint. 
The Authority may also, upon receipt of a complaint, decide 
k · l0
7 O h A h · t d ' d . to ta e no action. nee t e ut ori y eci es to invest-
igate a complaint, it has some powers to require those who, 
in its opinion, are able to give information relating to 
. h . f . 108 its investigation, to give sue in ormation. 
Once the Authority has undertaken an investigation, or 
has received a report on a Police investigation, it shall 
form an opinion on" ... whether or not any decision, recom-
106 Above n 104, section 5(1) 
107 Above n 104, section 17 
108 Above n 104, section 24 
• 
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mendation, act, omission, conduct, policy, practice, or 
procedure .•. was contrary to law, unreasonable, unjust-
ified, unfair or undesirable. 11109 This opinion, along 
with reasons for it, is to be conveyed to the Commissioner 
of Police. The Authority may also, as it sees fit, convey 
any recommendations to the Commissioner of Police.
110 
Thus, any person adversely affected by an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by the Police, and who is aggrieved 
with that exercise of discretion, is able to lay a corn-
plaint with the Police Complaints Authority. In this way 
the Authority may have a role to play in controlling the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
B Efficacy of the Police Complaints Authority in Con-
trolling Prosecutorial Discretion 
On the face of it, the Police Complaints Authority would 
appear to promote fairness within the prosecution process. 
The Authority can form an opinion as to a Police decision, 
recommendation, act, omission, conduct, policy, practice 
or procedure, which would cover individual exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion, or wider prosecution policies. 
Such an opinion might conclude that prosecutorial discre-
tion was being exercised in a manner that was contrary 
to law, unreasonable, unjustified, unfair or undesirable. 
109 Above n 104, sections 27 and 28 
110 Above n 104, sections 27 and 28 
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This would seem to indicate that prosecution decisions 
made in the absence of sufficient evidence, or those made 
in a manner that is contrary to accepted principles and 
standards, would fall within the Authority's sphere of 
influence. 
However, there are some problems with the degree to which 
the Authority promotes consistency within the prosecution 
process. Again, like the courts, the Police Complaints 
Authority is only a 'backup' solution. It does not pro-
mote consistency from within the prosecution process. 
Instead, it is a remedy for those who have been subjected 
to arbitrary decision-making which should not have occur-
red at all. 
Also, like the courts, the Authority relies on those who 
are aggrieved by prosecutorial decision-making to take 
action before it can act. A complaint must be laid to 
the Authority before it can contemplate action to rectify 
the situation. The degree to which defendants in the 
criminal justice system are likely to do this is unknown 
and uncertain, especially given the very high rate of 
guilty pleas that occurs within the system. 
As a mechanism external to the prosecution process, the 
Police Complaints Authority does promote accountability 
to a certain extent. It is a forum independent of the 
prosecution process where decision-makers can be called 
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to account, and those aggrieved by prosecution decisions 
can seek redress for incorrect or inappropriate decision-
making. While the Authority's powers to compel the 
Police to change their policies and practices are not 
extensive under the current Police Complaints Authority 
legislation, it has the power to force the Police to 
reconsider what they are doing and may recommend altern-
atives or solutions. Also, there is bound to be stigma 
involved for Police officers who are challenged via the 
Police Complaints Authority, especially when that chal-
lenge is upheld by the Authority. 
Thus, the Police Complaints Authority has some value as 
a means of controlling the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Its terms of reference are wide enough to 
catch exercises of prosecutorial discretion which are 
not in the interests of fairness, and as a means exter-
nal to the prosecution process, it promotes accountabil-
ity to a certain extent. However, the fact that it is 
external to the prosecution process also means that it 
will not necessarily promote consistency within the prose-
cution process. The role of the Authority is also limited 
by the fact that it relies on aggrieved parties to initiate 
its involvement. The extent to which this will occur is 
both unknown and uncertain. 
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VII CONCLUSIONS 
A Identification of the Problems 
This paper set out to examine the prosecution process 
in terms of looking at possible means of controlling the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. These various means 
of control were evaluated in terms of fairness, consistency 
and accountability. This evaluation also took into account 
any problems that have been or might be experienced with 
these possible control mechanisms. This evaluation threw 
up a number of factors which inhibit control of prosecu-
torial discretion. Any effective attempt to control the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will have to take 
these factors into account. 
With those mechanisms which are located within the prose-
cution process (that is, prosecution policy guidelines, 
the involvement of other decision-makers in the prosecu-
tion process and the giving of reasons for decisions), 
certain factors tend to inhibit their effectiveness. Some 
problems which were noted in relation to these mechanisms 
can be surmounted. For example, it was noted that diffi-
culties in relation to the interpretation of prosecution 
policy guidelines can be managed by such means as staff 
training, consultation between decision-makers and the 
like. 111 However, there are two problems which crop up in 
111 See above part III C 
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relation to mechanisms within the prosecution process, 
to which there is no simple or obvious solution. 
Firstly, there is the potential for front-line police 
officers to construct or de-construct criminal cases by 
manipulating and structuring information, principles and 
standards. In this way the results that the officer 
desires can be justified. And secondly, there tends to 
be a 'presumption in favour of prosecuting' which aper-
ates within the system. Once a prosecution is initiated, 
it will be rare for the initial decisions to be modified 
or reversed, even where it may be more correct or appro-
priate for the case to be handled in another way. 
As for those mechanisms which are external to the prose-
cution process, there are two main problems which inhibit 
their ability to control prosecutorial discretion. Firstly, 
these are backup solutions, in that they come into operation 
after an incorrect or inappropriate decision has been made. 
The fact that there is the possibility of redress for such 
decisions is a good thing, but the point is that such 
decisions should never have been made in the first place. 
And secondly, for such mechanisms to come into play, there 
must be action on the part of the aggrieved party. The 
extent to which this is likely to occur is both unknown 
and uncertain. 
The difficulties identified in relation to external control 
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mechanisms may possibly be combatted and controlled. The 
fact that these are backup solutions does not detract 
from their necessity. Even if attempts are made to control 
prosecutorial discretion from within the system, some 
backup will be necessary in the interests of justice for 
those cases which slip through the system. And the fact 
that such mechanisms require action on the part of aggrived 
parties need not be an insurmountable problem. The public 
should be made aware of the principles and standards 
governing decision-making, and of the availability of 
such mechanisms for those aggrieved by decision-making. 
The difficulties of case construction by front-line police 
officers, and of a presumption in favour of prosecuting 
are difficulties, to which solutions and answers are less 
obvious. These are problems which are rooted in the 
behaviour of actors within the system, but unfortunately 
that behaviour can not be divorced from the system. To 
some extent the system and its operation influence the 
behavioral patterns of those actors within the system. 
Most individuals behave in ways that they perceive that 
the system demands of them. For example, the point has 
been made that the overwhelming majority of defendants 
in the criminal justice system plead guilty and that this 
is largely due to the working of the system which expects 
them to plead guilty and may work against them in the 
event that they decide to exercise their due process rights 
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d t 1 f ·1 
112 s· · 1 1 an en er a pea o not gui ty. 1m1 ar y, the actions 
of front-line police officers in constructing and de-con-
structing criminal cases may well be seen as a response 
to what they perceive that the system wants of them. 
is, in cases in which they perceive formal action is 
That 
necessary they will do their utmost to ensure that this 
need is addressed by a prosecution, and in cases which 
they see as falling outside of the system's scope they 
will attempt to ensure that the case remains outside of 
the system. And if actors in the prosecution process 
operate on the basis of a presumption in favour of prose-
cuting, then it is likely that that presumption stems 
from a perception that prosecutorial action is what the 
system wants of them. 
Thus, while the problems appear in the form of human 
behaviour, to some extent it will be necessary to examine 
and address the system also if effective control of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is to be achieved. 
B The Limitations of the Law Reform Model 
The traditional response to the identification of prob-
lems in the legal system is to change the law or make 
more laws. However, some have questioned the extent to 
which this type of response will be effective when the 
problems are related to patterns of human behaviour. 
112 Above n 101, 153 
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Specifically, the efficacy of the law reform model has 
been questioned in relation to the regulation and con-
t 1 f 1 . b h . 113 I h b .d 114 ro o po ice e aviour. t as een sai , 
Legislators and government policy-makers have ignored 
the powerful working rules, linked to the particular 
goals of the police, which shape police conduct and 
decision-making. Where legal rules and working rules 
conflict, the latter will prevail unless there is 
both a real possibility of being discovered and effec-
tive sanctions for the breach of those legal rules ... 
Without these possibilities, legal rules become merely 
presentational devices which inform the police how 
their decisions must be presented in order to be in 
apparent conformity with the law. 
It has been suggested that it is meaningless to make 
rules and pass laws without addressing the occupational 
working rules whom those rules and laws are aimed at. 115 
In terms of the prosecution process, this means addressing 
the working rules of front-line police officers that 
influence the construction and de-construction of crim-
inal cases, and the working rules of actors in the prose-
cution process that result in a presumption in favour 
of prosecuting. 
C Repercussions for the Control of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
113 Above n 28; D Dixon, AK Bottomley, CA Coleman, M Gill, D Wall 
"Reality and Rules in the Construction and Regulation of Police 
Suspicion" (1989) 17 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 185 
114 Roger Leng, Michael McConville, Andrew Sanders "Researching the 
Discretions to Charge and to Prosecute" in David Downes (ed) 
Unravelling Criminal Justice (MacMillan, Houndmills, 1992) 119, 135 
115 Above n 29, 198-200; Above n 114, 137; D Dixon, AK Bottomley, 
CA Coleman, M Gill, D Wall "Reality and Rules in the Construction 
and Regulation of Police Suspicion" (1989) 17 International Journal 
of the Sociology of Law 185, 204 
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If the key problem in controlling prosecutorial discre-
tion is rooted in the behaviour of actors in the prose-
cution process, and if the making of rules and laws is 
of limited value in controlling such behaviour, then 
the answer to the control of prosecutorial discretion 
becomes even more elusive. In light of all of this, 
it then becomes somewhat pointless to merely outline a 
blueprint for an 'ideal' prosecution process. And if 
the behaviour of actors within the prosecution process 
is heavily influenced by their perceptions of what the 
system requires of them (as noted above), then it becomes 
necessary to address the issue of just what purposes the 
prosecution process should serve. 
It has been said that,
116 
The criminal justice process not only imposes order 
but reproduces a particular form of social order 
which involves class, race and gender biases and 
which differentially distributes opportunity, wealth 
and power between different groups in society. 
Thus, the prosecution process is an integral part of a 
mechanism of social control and ordering, and as such 
can not be considered in isolation from the other parts 
of the criminal justice system. The prosecution process 
should be seen as an important part of this system which 
is a means of meeting the needs of offenders, victims and 
the wider community. For example, in cases where an 
offender requires treatment of some kind (such as in the 
case of sexual offenders), the prosecution process is a 
116 Above n 29, 208 
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means of getting the offender diverted to the most approp-
riate institution or program. 
The prosecution process should not be seen as a self-
contained part of the criminal justice process, and its 
purposes can not be overlooked. In fact, the purposes 
of the prosecution process, and of the criminal justice 
system as a whole should form an important part of the 
training of actors within the prosecution process. Only 
when the purposes of the prosecution process are clear 
to such individuals can they be expected to respond in 
ways that are consistent with those purposes. Training 
of this nature is important if perceptions of what the 
criminal justice system demands of actors within that 
system are to be consistent with the purposes of the 
system. 
Control of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
an elusive thing. It will only be achieved when the 
actors within the prosecution process clearly recognise 
the purposes of that process and recognise the forms of 
action that they should be taking. Until such recog-
nition is achieved the working rules of actors within 
the prosecution process will continue to make control 
of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion an elusive 
concept. 
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